2014 HM Government v. Börnatfiglheu

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Din el Cort dels Edilicieux


1 Aug 2014/XXXV

Brief of the ruling

Opinion of the Court delivered by
Magistrate Txec dal Nordselva


His Majesty's Government, in the person of Attorney-General Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun, brought criminal charges against citizen Eiric S. Bornatfiglheu. He was charged with seventeen counts of violation of 36RZ10 (fraudulent immigration and creation of a fake personality) and fifteen counts of violation of 947.0125 of the Criminal Codes of Wisconsin (harassing, abusing, and/or annoying others with false online identities). S:reu Bornatfiglheu pled guilty to all charges.

The Attorney-General also presented, in the same proceedings, a request for an injunction against the Chancery, arguing that the original Writ of Termination of Citizenship issued to S:reu Bornatfiglheu was invalid.


The defendant having pled guilty on 17 misdemeanor charges of violating 36RZ10 and 15 misdemeanor charges of violating Wisconsin Code 947.0125, the court hereby finds the defendant, Eric Kildow, guilty as charged.

Statement by
Magistrate Txec dal Nordselva


There is little doubt that the trust placed in S:reu Kildow by the nation was shattered, perhaps irreparably, when it was revealed the sheer magnitude of his crimes against the Kingdom. The Court is not lacking in mercy but it also understands that an example must be set.

Therefore, the Court sentences the convicted as follows:

For each of the 17 counts of violating 36RZ10, S:reu Kildow is sentenced to 8 months of civic disability per conviction to run consecutively beginning from today, August 11, 2014 thereby totaling 136 months wherein the defendant shall not hold any national office including Member of the Cosa, Senator, Member of the Cabinet, Seneschal or any office of the Royal Household, including subsidiary positions or any created national office for the duration of the sentence (any questions about whether an office falls under these guidelines may be revisited at the request of any party to this action.)

For each of the 15 counts of violating Wisconsin Code 947.0125, S:reu Kildow is sentenced to 90 days per conviction of civic disability, to run consecutively following the previous sentence totaling 45 months wherein the defendant shall not hold any national office including Member of the Cosa, Senator, Member of the Cabinet, Seneschal, or any office of the Royal Household, including subsidiary positions or any created national office for the duration of the sentence (any questions about whether an office falls under these guidelines may be revisited at the request of any party to this action.)

Additionally, the Court imposes of fine of $100 to be paid by the end of the calendar year 2014 to the Burgermeister of Inland Revenue. The convicted may work out whatever arrangement is necessary with the Court and the Burgermeister.

Additionally, the Court sentences S:reu Kildow to complete 500 hours of community service within five years to be supervised by the Court or its appointed agent. Arrangements for and acceptable forms of the community service shall be completed between the Court and the defendant upon conclusion of this trial.

Finally, the Court hereby revokes the citizenship of S:reu Kildow. The order of revocation is suspended under the following conditions: that S:reu Kildow fully pays his fine by 12/31/2014, that S:reu Kildow makes no attempt at creating another account for any reason, that S:reu Kildow fulfills the terms of his sentence in whole and also that no other criminal convictions occur in any Court of Talossa against S:reu Kildow. At the conclusion of his civic disability, the Court orders the revocation of citizenship to be dismissed.

Total civic disability and length of suspended sentence to equal 181 months. Once the matter of the injunction is resolved, the defendant will be released on his own recognizance.

Statement by
Magistrate Txec dal Nordselva

Ruling on Supplementary Injunction

The Cort has carefully weighed the arguments presented to it. The government, as part of its complaint against S:reu Kildow has stated its belief that the Chancery acted inorganically in its writ of termination of citizenship against S:reu Kildow and his “sock-puppets.” The basis of the argument being that S:reu Kildow never publicly renounced but did so via email to King John, to which King John posted the said renunciation onto Wittenberg. There is little doubt that S:reu Kildow did indeed make this renunciation to His Majesty. After the posting by the king, the Chancery acted in what it believed to be a lawful manner and duly terminated the citizenships of the 18 persons (1 real and 17 imagined).

The Chancery has argued that 1) the government has no standing in this issue, 2), the injunction request omits certain facts (i.e. a public renunciation), 3), the Chancery cannot overrule a valid renunciation, 4) there is no reason to assume a renunciation did not occur, 5) restoring citizenship for the sock-puppets is not reasonable, and 6) the Attorney General has acted improperly “behind the scenes.”


Standing - The Chancery stated in its brief that the government cannot “bring action to compel the Chancery to reconsider a decision unless they have a compelling interest in the decision.” What would be a compelling interest that would bring the government standing? The answer is proper enforcement of statutory and Organic law. It is the opinion of this court that if the government is acting to ensure that statutory and/or Organic law is applied correctly, it does have standing to bring action to correct an incorrect application of law.

Public renunciation - Organic Law is quite clear on how a renunciation must occur. OrgLaw XVIII Section 9 states “Talossans may voluntarily renounce their own citizenship. This may be done by publicly issuing a written Declaration of Renunciation. It shall take immediate effect upon its acknowledgement by the Secretary of State through issuance of a Writ of Termination of Citizenship, which shall be published under the seal of the Chancery.” This law has two key components: a public renunciation and a Writ of Termination of Citizenship issued under the seal of the Chancery. The Chancery issued the legally required Writ but did S:reu Kildow publicly renounce? In Exhibit B of this case, the King stated in his public statement to the Kingdom, “I don’t know whether he intends to renounce his citizenship.” In Exhibit C, the Writ of Termination of Citzenship dated 27 January 2013 states, “Whereas the person responsible has renounced his citizenship.” In Exhibit D, S:reu Kildow stated on 12 January 2014 “I resigned my citizenship in the Kingdom of Talossa.” It wasn’t until the Chancery’s brief that the statements allegedly by the defendant and posted publicly by the King were presented wherein the defendant stated “consider this my renunciation of citizenship. This omission by the government is rather glaring and immensely bothers the Court. The Court has a rather uncertain path forward and so it looks to precedent to help settle the issue.

In Lowry v. Chancery, the Uppermost Cort ruled that “…the declaration must be made publicly. While it can certainly be argued that an e-mail or PM to the Secretary of State constitutes a public declaration, this seems inconsistent with the intended purpose of this provision. Interpreted to mean any communication with the SoS constitutes “public declaration” places an undo amount of discretion in the hands of the Secretary and limits public oversight.” In this case, S:reu Kildow emailed the King who then publicly posted the said renunciation. S:reu Kildow himself did not publicly post his renunciation as is required by law and precedent. However, it is also established fact that S:reu Kildow was unable to post publicly due to his account being suspended in an ex parte order of the Uppermost Cort. The question that remains, therefore, is in the absence of the ability to post a public renunciation, is one posted via a third party (in this case the King) valid?

The defendant argues that he was under duress when he submitted his renunciation via email to the king. Was the mentioning of the potential of both macro national and micro national prosecution a form of duress that coerced the defendant into acting in a manner in which he would otherwise not have acted? None of the parties have deposed the king in this matter so all we have is what he has stated as well as what the defendant has stated in his own words to which he has never denied in this Court saying.

If a public renunciation did not occur, then the third argument of the Chancery is irrelevant. The court has already stated that it is not considering injunctive relief on the part of the 17 fake citizens and stated in its decision that to do so would be inconsistent with the guilty verdicts of creating the said accounts.


What is therefore germane to this ruling are three issues: standing of the Attorney General, public renunciation and duress. In the case of public renunciation, if one did occur then this injunctive request is null and void. If a renunciation was not validly delivered, no Writ could legally have been presented. Likewise, if duress occurred, even if a public renunciation did validly occur, in the courts discretion it could nullify the Writ. The Court is bound by statute (both Organic and Statutory) as well as precedent set by the Uppermost Cort. Organic Law is clear on the matter of public renunciations but not clear as to what public means. However, Lowry v. Chancery is remarkably similar in many respects wherein a renunciation occurred via either email (in the present matter) or PM (in the Lowry case) and that both Lowry and Kildow were under some form of pressure. Lowry holds that a renunciation must be made specifically by the renouncing citizen and cannot be the statement, no matter how valid, of another person (i.e. the Chancery as part of the Royal Household). The King, despite his best intentions, is not S:reu Kildow and so under this precedent is not entitled to publicly renounce on another persons behalf.The court finds that no valid public renunciation occurred. As the court has determined no public renunciation occurred prior to the Writ of Termination, the subject of duress need be considered no further.

It is also the opinion of this court that the Attorney General possesses standing in that he is seeking proper enforcement of the law as to the application of OrgLaw XVIII Section 9.


The court hereby issues an injunction against the Chancery of the Kingdom of Talossa to not enforce the Writ of Termination of S:reu Kildow thereby restoring the citizenship of the defendant. until such time as this injunction can be reviewed by the Uppermost Court. The 17 nonentities referred to frequently as sock puppets were never legally citizens from the beginning but fraudulent creations and therefore this court denies the injunction request of the government for these pretend persons.

Additionally, the Attorney General has moved into the territory of contempt of this court in his ex parte discussions with the Secretary of State but the court notes that these discussions to do not seem to have tainted the proceedings which is the only reason why this court is not now imposing sanctions on the Attorney General. The court hereby warns S:reu da Lhiun that any further missteps during this trial will result in sanctions imposed by the court.

Statement by
Magistrate Txec dal Nordselva

Transcript of Proceedings

The proceedings of the case can be found here.